Hello and
welcome everybody to our webinar
for today.
Today I'm very pleased to that.
We have Dorothy Kronick,
to help us understand what is going on
with the US, as I just called it,
an invasion ish, intervention.
Whatever we're doing in Venezuela.
So help us understand whatever we're doing
as the US in Venezuela.
Dorothy Kronick is an associate professor
of public policy at the Goldman School
of Public Policy at Berkeley.
I've known Dorothy
for a pretty long time now.
And I know that she's done all this
great work on Latin American politics,
especially focus on all sorts
of issues of Venezuelan politics.
I mean, she was interested in Venezuela
before Venezuela was cool.
And her work has been published
all over the place, including in the,
the American Political Science Review,
the journal Politics, Science,
Science Advances.
She's also commented on Venezuela
in places like The New York Times
and The Washington Post.
So I'm going to let Dorothy,
tell us
all about, what is going on in Venezuela.
So take it away. Dorothy.
Thank you so much for having me.
What is going on in Venezuela?
So I think we're all here
because 17 days ago, on January 3rd,
the US military carried out
strikes on 12 targets within Venezuela
and captured and extracted, extracted
then President Nicolas Maduro
and his wife, Celia Flores,
and brought them to New York,
where they are now in custody.
So what I thought I'd do, just in very
brief remarks before we go to discussion
and Q&A, is talk a little bit more about
what happened that day.
And you said invasion ish,
what are we doing?
What did Trump say?
And and then also what's happening now
and then maybe
just open a conversation
about what might happen next.
Okay.
So going back to January 3rd, hours
after Trump
announced that the US military
had captured and extracted
Nicolas Maduro and Celia Flores,
he gave a press conference
in which he announced
that the US would be running Venezuela
and that we would be working
with Delcy Rodriguez,
who until then had been Nicolas
Maduro's vice president,
and in in in some ways
this wasn't surprising.
So there had been rumors for months,
and it was even reported
in the New York Times in the fall
that Delcy was a possible successor
to Nicolas Maduro.
That possibly there were conversations
between Delcy and other Travis leaders
and the Trump administration.
But in other ways,
it was deeply surprising to hear Trump say
that the United States
would be working with Delcy, in part
because she was vice president
in this administration
that Trump had long,
criticized as illegitimate.
And and in part
because she while it is true
that in many ways
she has moderated over recent years,
historically Delcy was,
very much in lockstep
with Maduro, in line with longstanding
Chavista rhetoric that rejects U.S.
intervention, that rejects U.S.
imperialism and her family background.
So her her father, who's he's
kind of been glossed in the press
as a Marxist guerrilla,
but I think that that's that's maybe not
the best way of thinking about it.
He founded, political party
that was a left wing
splinter faction of a party
that was itself a left wing splinter
faction of Venezuela's major left party.
And I was actually just
reading his collected speeches,
and he was a kind of deeply
ideological Marxist.
And so, many reporters
and analysts have reported
that the experience of, of, of her father,
who then also orchestrated
the kidnaping of American
of an American businessman
and was arrested and tortured and killed
by Venezuela's elected government
in the 1970s, that that experience
was tremendously radicalizing
for Delcy Rodriguez and Jorge Rodriguez.
Right.
So to hear Trump say, oh, we're working
with this person who was vice president
under a regime that we have long
claimed is totally illegitimate
and then, on the other hand, have Delcy
turning around with her background.
And working with Trump,
I think in some ways was surprising.
I think many were also surprised
in that press conference
that Trump sidelined and kind of dismissed
Maria Corina machado,
the leader of the Venezuelan opposition,
who was behind a very successful
opposition
presidential election campaign last year.
I guess now, yeah, in 2024,
in which the opposition
candidate, backed by Maria Corina
herself, was barred from running.
But the candidate she backed,
Edmundo Gonzalez, won in a landslide
won [...] 2 to 1.
And Maria Corina
and her team organized this like,
truly extraordinary effort
to document the vote
and not just claim that they won
and that Maduro stole the election, but
show the world that Edmundo Gonzalez won
and that they had won the election.
And and last fall, Maria
Corina Machado won a Nobel Peace Prize.
And so then Trump in his press conference,
says she doesn't
have the support
or respect to run the country.
She's a nice lady,
but she doesn't have the
with the support or respect.
I think many,
many people found that surprising.
I think what's important to note
is not only that
Maria Corina and her political movement
had a lot of support and respect in 2024.
At the moment
of that presidential election, but
that according to polls,
even even though I think it is the case
that she lost some support and approval
over the course of 2025
as she,
supported a lot of actions that Trump
was taking that weren't very popular,
did not condemn sending Venezuelan
migrants to a maximum security prison
in El Salvador, or the boat
strikes, the strikes on alleged
drug trafficking boats
in the Caribbean, etc., etc.
even with that loss of support,
it is definitely not accurate to say
she has no support or respect
in the Venezuelan population.
What may be closer to true
is that she didn't have
the support in the Venezuelan military
that the Trump administration felt
would be necessary to make
make her leadership viable at this moment.
And certainly if she had a lot of support
in the Venezuelan military,
one might have expected
a political transition in 2024.
After that, political
after that presidential election
that Edmundo Gonzalez won in a landslide.
So let me talk a little bit.
So that's kind of
what happened on January 3rd.
And let me talk a little bit
about what's happening now.
So since then, as Trump announced,
the administration has been working with
Delcy Rodriguez, formerly Maduro's vice
president, now president of Venezuela.
And really the first major thing
that has happened
is the resumption
of sales of Venezuelan oil.
So in 2019, the first Trump administration
imposed oil sanctions on Venezuela
that caused a huge decline in Venezuelan
oil production and Venezuelan oil sales,
and as a result, a huge decline
in government revenues
and further deterioration of an economy
that was devastated
by decades of mismanagement
and especially terrible mismanagement
under Nicolas Maduro.
And so what's happened
now since January 3rd is that
the administration has already sold
or allowed the sale of hundreds
of millions of dollars of Venezuelan oil.
And a lot of that money
has actually already made its way
back into the Venezuelan economy
through the central banks,
and has been through the central bank
and is being sold by private banks.
And so what I'm hearing
from friends in Caracas
is, you know,
on the one hand, a lot of pessimism
about the political situation.
You know, how is Trump
just leaving the same government in charge
and at the same time,
this kind of flicker of cautious optimism
that could the economy improve
and could that alleviate a lot of forms
of suffering?
So a few days ago,
when this first tranche of dollars
from oil sales made their way back
into the Venezuelan economy,
what people are seeing on the ground is
on their app that shows the exchange rate.
Buying foreign exchange, buying dollars
with Venezuelan currency is becoming
dramatically cheaper.
It's like all of a sudden it's easier
to buy foreign exchange.
And as a result,
there's anticipation of perhaps
major drops in the price of imports,
which would be really
helpful for consumption,
and more availability of goods.
Now, all of that,
all of that said, I said cautious optimism
because there are still so many questions
about whether this will happen
and whether it will work.
So one big question mark is,
you know, one thing that Trump said
is that the dollars from these oil
sales would be used
only to import
goods made in the United States, US goods.
Right. So this is some sort of trade deal.
And if that were the case,
I think that could be a tremendously
difficult to administer and implement,
given that it's the Venezuelan private
sector that's in charge of imports.
So how do you check what they're importing
only from the United States, etc.?
And so that could be very distortion free.
But it seems that in this
first round of oil sales,
those restrictions were not imposed.
And so there was this kind of
little economic lift.
And so
there's a lot of
uncertainty about what's going to happen.
But I do think there's a possibility
that the resumption of oils
are not not unlikely at all,
that the resumption of oil sales
will really help the Venezuelan economy
and, and potentially alleviate
some of this tremendous economic hardship
that Venezuela has experienced
over the past, really ten years now.
I want to say one thing.
And then I know
we have a lot of questions,
about kind of political prospects.
Right.
Because I'm talking a little bit
about the economy.
But one one possibility here
on the political side
is that if there is some measure
of economic recovery
that could lead to or help
the further consolidation
of the Chavista dictatorship.
Right.
So the the government of Nicolas
Maduro, this was not a democracy.
At this
point, I don't see a lot of reason
to expect that the government
of Delcy Rodriguez
and the other leading Chavista figures
would become a democracy
or would be democratized.
And so
I think one possible outcome here
is that the resumption of oil
sales leads to economic recovery,
but does not end up restoring Venezuelans
political rights.
Right. I think that's one possibility.
Another possibility
is that this kind of modus vivendi
that's emerging between Caracas
and Washington breaks down and,
I don't know, there's some demand
from Washington that
that Delcy Rodriguez's government
doesn't want to meet.
And that that leads to kind of renewed,
renewed violence or renewed tensions.
There's also the possibility
that fractures
within the Rodriguez administration,
within the Chavista leadership,
could lead to more unrest and contestation
and violence within Venezuela.
And I want to say something
about the possibility, however remote
it might seem in this moment
of re-democratization
and a democratic transition.
So let me preface this by saying
no one in Washington
has put democracy
at the top of the agenda.
Not even close.
So Trump in his press conference
on January 3rd, didn't even mention
democracy.
Rubio, in an interview the next day,
a journalist asked him about a timeline
for elections, and he just looks
at the camera and says, elections, right?
Like the elections.
And we have
we haven't heard anything about this.
Right.
And obviously, Delcy Rodriguez is not a
pro-democracy activist, to put it mildly.
And at the same time, I, I,
I can't give up hope.
And I think there's a path.
And one thing
that I want to point out here
is that Venezuela
does have a really long history
of elections, of extraordinarily high
turnout, of kind of democratic traditions
and institutions that,
of course, have been massively
debilitated in recent years and weakened.
But yet that kind of as we saw
in the presidential election in 2024,
the habit of participating in elections,
the habit of defensa voto like,
just like monitoring the vote
and documenting the vote,
those traditions are very strong.
And in fact, Venezuela's
electoral technology, meaning the physical
voting machines that have been in
use for, yeah, 20 years now,
also were what allowed the
opposition in 2024 to show the world
that Edmundo Gonzalez won that election.
Right.
And so there's a lot of kind
of electoral technology,
infrastructure,
the shadow of former institutions
and tradition and practice
that I think make some of the comparisons
we've seen in the press where people say,
well, Venezuela is Iraq or Libya, etc.
are really not not the right comparison.
Right.
And so do I anticipate
that Washington will say,
use this new leverage to.
Require that
the Rodriguez Delcy Rodriguez government
and opposition
members to the Supreme Court
or to the Electoral Council or
or, you know, require opposition
representation in the cabinet or promote
the kind of institutional reforms
that political scientists have long
recognized are needed
for a more stable democracy,
like lowering the stakes of power.
No, I do, I see it.
Does that seem likely?
Is that what people are talking about? No.
And again,
I for one, can't just give up all hope
that any of that
could be on the agenda, on the horizon.
And I do think that,
there is so much activity and energy
in the Venezuelan electorate,
in Venezuelan political activists and NGOs
and human rights organizations,
that there is some base for those changes.
It's not impossible.
So let me stop there.
And I know Maggie
had a few questions to start, and then I
hope we can have a conversation
with everyone here as well.
Great, thanks, Dorothy. Yes.
If you have a question,
I already see some in the Q&A,
but please take your question into the Q&A
and I'll make sure
we try to get to them all.
One more, one sort of more like table
setting question I had for you was
you just brought up, like, this long
history of democracy in Venezuela.
You know, 30 years ago, it was one of the
most stable countries in Latin America.
So how did we get Chavez and Maduro?
How did it become a dictatorship?
Why did the economy entirely collapse
in about 2017?
Part I mean, that was like
the hard collapse in 2017.
But if we go back further,
like why did we see the economy collapse?
Well, yes.
We could we could talk about
those questions for the rest of the day.
Let me start with
maybe rather than starting with why
Chavez came to power in 1998,
although I would love to talk about that,
and I have done
some published work on that.
Maybe just starting with the present
and thinking about the economic,
the economic collapse.
So I guess what I would say about
Venezuela's economic deterioration is
this has been the largest peacetime
economic contraction
in recorded economic history.
So the Venezuelan
economy collapsed 70%, basically.
And just by way of comparison,
the U.S during the Great Depression,
the cumulative collapse over a longer
period was 24%.
Something like that, like the 2008.
The US economy, I think shrank 4%.
So 70% is a lot. Right.
And what are the causes of this?
I think we need to really put them in
two buckets.
One is well actually three buckets.
One is the collapse of oil prices in 2014.
Actually, prior to 2017,
you already see some economic decline.
And that collapse of oil prices
is bad for the oil sector,
for oil production and bad
for the Venezuelan economy overall.
But then oil prices recover
and the Venezuelan
economy and Venezuela
imports don't recover.
And I think that the Venezuelan economists
who have best documented
this point to two factors, one is a series
of tremendously damaging
and tremendously distortionary
economic policy decisions
by the Nicolas Maduro government
not only a disastrous lack of investment
in the oil sector and hostility to,
multinational oil companies
that then leads to further deterioration,
but also, spending tons of money
subsidizing propping up
Venezuela's exchange rate
in the Venezuelan currency, which was just
fiscally devastating and, again,
created tremendous distortions.
There's actually there's a great book
about all of these mistakes
that Maduro made by Francisco Rodriguez,
think it's called Venezuela's Collapse,
but recent book by Francisco Rodriguez,
just walking through all those economic
policy decisions that were so devastating.
But then the other factor,
of course, is U.S.
sanctions.
And actually, I see a question
in the chat, from William,
to what extent do we attribute
these economic issues to sanctions?
So in 2017, as Maggie,
I think was was mentioning,
there were not the oil sanctions,
but other sanctions that affected,
Venezuela's access to credit and access
to international financial markets.
And so already we see the 2017 sanctions
affecting the economy.
And then early 2019, 2019 is the imposition of oil sanctions that absolutely
devastates oil production and oil sales.
And so there is some debate, I think,
among to answer William's questions.
There's some debate among Venezuelan
economists about the relative,
you know, role of Maduro's terrible
iconography, mismanagement
versus US sanctions
in producing the 70% decline,
some estimates are 50%
is due to sanctions.
And in the absence of sanctions,
the economy would have declined 35%,
which is still huge, right.
But it's kind of more
there's more precedent for it. 35%
collapse.
We see many kind of macro economic
populist cycles
in Latin American history
that have that size of contraction.
So some estimates say
have other people say
no, no, that's
overestimating the impact of sanctions.
And it's actually more like 25%. Right.
So there's debate about that.
No one, you know, all the kind of serious
work on this would suggest,
kind of
majority responsibility
of Maduro's terrible
economic policy decisions
and the collapse in oil price,
but a substantial role
for for US sanctions as well.
Right.
One question you mentioned, a little bit
about like the coalition,
the Chavismo coalition that's sort of
holding together so much in terms
of the military people like Delcy, others,
[...] do they still have an ideology
or is it just like kleptocracy
at this point?
That is such an interesting question.
To the extent
that Chavismo ever had an ideology.
And let me say one thing
that people always kind of talked
about distinguishing Chavez
from, say, Fidel or even even Eva Morales
and other kind of left
presidents of of the early 2000s
is that Chaves,
didn't
have this kind of gaggle of intellectuals
writing, you know, there was no kind
of party organ with lots of,
you know, clear ideological statement.
So it was always kind of fluid
in that way.
And that said, to the extent
that there were these core
kind of elements of Chavez's
worldview of being anti-imperialist,
anti United States
and also like, like past Venezuelan
governments, very much,
you know, state investment in the economy,
tremendous levels of state spending.
People I've seen
people say in these last weeks
that Chavez nationalized the oil sector.
That is not true.
Venezuelan well, was nationalized
in the 70s, but kind of
there were other national big
nationalizations under Chavez.
And so those anti, you know,
anti-imperialism
and state role in the economy,
were core tenets, I think, of
of Chavez's government
and for a while of Maduro's government.
And then we've just seen that totally
abandoned, I would say, for the most part,
under under
Maduro and under Delcy,
I mean, in part in part by necessity.
Right.
But but over the past few years,
the Maduro government
liberalized not politically
but in terms of economic policy
and removed a bunch of controls and,
and, and, and in some people would say
became a government of austerity,
like a neoliberal, almost economic policy,
again, in part by necessity.
But that was a complete departure,
I think, from the economic ideology
to the extent that there was
any of the Chavez government.
And then also,
you know, on the imperialism,
here we have Delcy Rodriguez,
you know, working with Trump.
So I think that is
an ideological departure as well.
Yeah. Great.
And then one, I'm going to ask you
one more question before I ask a couple
more from the Q&A.
What is up with the cartels?
So, you know, Trump last
at the start of last year
and especially through the fall,
focused a lot of this about drugs
and drugs in the United States.
And the case against Nicolas Maduro
and his wife is about drugs.
Oh, what a have
you heard anything about
like what are the cartels doing?
What is the government doing it?
The cartels and even just stepping back
a sec, how much do people think
that Maduro and the government
was involved with the cartels?
Versus either
they didn't either they were worried
about trying to take them on
because they're worried about violence,
similar to what we've seen elsewhere.
Or they couldn't take them on.
Yes. Super interesting.
So I will answer your question
about what is known about drug
trafficking in Venezuela
and the involvement
of Maduro in particular, and other people
in the government in general.
And before
doing that, I think it's really important
to address some of the Trump
administration specific claims.
Right.
So one one claim related to
this whole narrative
is that the Venezuelan gang Tren
de Aragua is invading the United States,
or has perpetrated a predatory incursion
against the United States.
That was the justification
for invoking the Alien Enemies Act
and sending 250 Venezuelans
to a maximum security prison
in El Salvador last March
without any due process.
Right. And so I would on that.
I would say not only that, multiple courts
have found, including the Fifth Circuit,
that there is no basis for the claim
that this gang is invading
or perpetrating a predatory incursion
against the United States.
But in addition, Maggie,
I have been working in my research
on kind of trying to characterize
that that group of migrants
as a whole that were set to El Salvador
and trying to use some quantitative tools
to assess Trump's claim that they're all
and they're all, you know,
and at every last one of them, members
of Tren de Aragua.
And, you know, our estimates,
you will not be surprised to
hear are just not
consistent with that at all.
Also in the days since January 3rd,
there was a White House,
at least a tweet saying that, Maduro
was a major supplier of the fentanyl
that is the source of the tremendous drug
crisis and overdose crisis
we have in the United States.
And that is just totally false.
Venezuela is not a major supplier
of fentanyl.
Venezuela is a a major but significant
transshipment route for cocaine
and has been for decades, since the 90s.
And then even more so in the early 2000,
perhaps because of some changes, policy
changes under Chavez,
but also because of Plan Colombia
and a big crackdown on protests
in Colombia.
So Venezuela has long
been a transshipment route
for hundreds of metric tons of cocaine
every year.
And it has long
been the case that Venezuelan
government officials
have been implicated in that.
In fact, the the term that you've heard
Trump throwing around, Cartel de
Los Soles, Cartel of the Suns, is a term
that was, was, was
the advent of that was in the 1990s,
because Venezuelan generals
have sun insignia on their uniforms.
And in the 90s there was this a famous case of a member of the National Guard who,
was indicted
and tried for drug trafficking.
And so there was this discussion of,
you know, Venezuelan military involvement
in drug trafficking.
And there there were even rumors
of Venezuelan presidents, pre-Chavez
being involved,
as well as all I can tell you about that.
And you know,
when when we were together at Stanford
and I was doing my dissertation,
I actually wrote a paper about cocaine
trafficking through Venezuela,
and I was very intrigued at that time.
This was whatever, 2015
by this idea of Cartel of the Suns,
and then ended up
having a footnote in that paper saying
it's it's really a figure of speech like
this is not actually a cartel.
That was the understanding at the time.
That was long before
Trump was on the political scene or,
or talking about this issue.
Right. So,
in terms of Maduro,
what exactly was his role in drug
trafficking that, I don't know.
I do think the general kind of perception
and sense from reporters
who worked on this is,
the Venezuelan government was deeply
implicated in allowing drug trafficking
that is very different from being like
the operational head of a cartel.
Right.
And I, for one,
will be very interested
to see whether these specific charges
that are being brought
in the Southern district of New York
about narco terrorism,
about cocaine trafficking, and about,
I think, wielding a machine
gun for the purposes of drug trafficking,
whether Maduro will be convicted
ultimately on those charges,
I will be very interested to see.
All right.
We have several questions
asking about the
the ties between Venezuela and Cuba.
So both thinking about the
influence that Cuba had over Venezuela.
And then on the flip side,
kind of like what happens to Cuba now.
So for maybe those who don't know
as much about the ties
between the cast,
the former Castro regime and Chavez,
maybe you can explain a little bit
about kind of like what the ties were
and then kind of what you think this
how this might affect Cuba going forward.
Okay.
Sure. Yeah.
So just in terms of background,
Chavez saw Fidel Castro as a mentor
and got a lot of,
I think, reportedly very important advice
from from him over the years.
And when the oil price of oil
began to rise in the mid 2000,
Venezuela
began supplying Cuba with a lot of oil.
And this was a huge support
to the Cuban economy.
And in return, Cuba
not only at one point was sending
a lot of doctors to Venezuela, but
but really importantly, took a big role in
the Cuba in the Venezuelan,
domestic
surveillance
and military intelligence organizations.
And so that role of the Cubans
in kind of domestic
repression enforcement
and especially surveillance
and enforcement
in the military explains why
32 of the approximately 80 known victims
of the US military strikes
this January 3rd were Cubans,
because so many of those deaths occurred
in the kind of final assault
on the compound.
And so many of the bodyguards were Cuban,
32 of of any that's really high,
proportion.
And so
let me say
one more thing about the victims.
And then I want to get to your question
about what does this mean for Cuba.
So I haven't seen a lot of people
talking about about the victims.
You know, these 80 victims, right?
Because there's been so many other things
to talk about over the past 17 days.
But I do think it's worth
taking a moment to note,
not only there were
a few civilian victims,
but also, you know, many of the, victims
who were in the military installations,
the military bases,
that were the target of U.S.
strikes.
They were
members of the Venezuelan military.
And so I think Stephen Miller described
this as enemy kills.
All of these were enemy kills. And.
The members of the Venezuelan
military who were left there
kind of guarding the Guardia
like in charge of these stations
over the holiday week,
in many cases, were kind of right,
the youngest folks
with the least responsibility
for anything. Right.
And so I think it's just important
to acknowledge that.
And and there's actually a beautiful piece
in The New Yorker today
kind of reporting on some of these cases
and some of these families.
But back to your question.
What does this mean for Cuba?
So I think, you know, when we think about
why did this happen, why did the US decide
to carry out this strike and how did we
how did we end up in this situation
where a president who campaigned on
no forever wars, no nation building
is now in the situation
of striking Venezuela
and removing the president
and saying that we're going to
we're going to run Venezuela.
And I think part of the answer
is about a show of force on drugs.
And we can talk about the kind of
headlines and what Fox News
has been reporting on drug.
And then part of it is,
you know,
Marco Rubio,
the secretary of state, having strong,
I think, personal beliefs
and personal reasons to want to see
the end of the Venezuelan and Cuban
dictatorships and also political reasons.
Right.
Because of this South Florida audience
that would so value
regime change in Venezuela
and certainly regime change in Cuba.
And so I think that is
a really important thing to keep in mind
when we think about what's going to happen
next.
And again, on the immediate front,
I do think that
this new arrangement
will result in immediately
less funds flowing to Cuba.
And that's going to be really tough
for the Cuban economy
and possibly for the Cuban regime as well.
Yeah. Great.
One sort of follow-up of
that was thinking a little bit
about and your comment about it
being the holiday week
and maybe there weren't
the best people on on duty at that point.
But kind of the question was like,
how like how did
the security apparatus get overwhelmed
so easily?
Is there any idea that, like, anybody from
the inside had a hand on hand in this?
There's a lot of talk about that.
And I see that great question
from Steve in the chat.
And I don't I wish I had great Intel.
Someday it'll come out.
I mean, it does seem it's I don't know.
The answer is I'm a researcher,
I don't I'm not in the CIA.
I don't know, I,
yeah, it does seem like a
palace coup is definitely plausible,
but I don't know.
Yeah.
Yeah, yeah.
I mean, I could tell you
the case that Delcy is like.
Sure, I'll make sure the the like
the not so great people on duty right now.
Yeah, yeah.
I mean, who knows I don't know.
Yeah. Yeah. Great.
Let's see
a lot of great questions.
So one question
that I'm going to take next, in part
because, you know, I study migration.
So, you know, I'm,
you know, I'm thinking about that.
So what how do you think this affects
the Venezuelan diaspora in the U.S?
How do you think it affects the greater
Venezuelan diaspora in the region as well?
So, you know, in my work
and like Venezuelans in Colombia,
of course, everybody,
you know, people always say when you
who have migrated,
who are sort of forced to do it
immediately,
like, oh, we want to return home.
But do you think we're
likely to see people returning home
any time soon?
And how do you think this might,
affect the Venezuelan diaspora
in the U.S for good or for ill?
Yeah.
Well, I think there's two,
maybe two aspects of that.
One is about migration.
And then we could also talk
about voting in US politics.
Right.
And Colombian politics for that matter.
So on returning,
it's really hard to know because there's
so much uncertainty about how stable
the current arrangements are.
Right?
We don't know how the extent to which
the Chavista leadership really is unified.
And this kind of Delcy
government is stable.
We don't know.
We don't know how long
Trump will be in office
and whether these policies could change.
Right.
And what happens if,
if, if Trump were to be out of office
and then US policy changes,
how does that affect,
you know, the Venezuelan government?
I think you're
already hearing some of that.
Wariness and kind of
skepticism and uncertainty
from the oil companies.
Right.
Trump has asked these oil companies
to make these big investments in Venezuela
that would be required
to really revive the oil sector and,
we're hearing from these executives
like, well, we we don't we don't
we don't have a lot of guarantees.
And I think I would think
that those same kind of concerns
and risk aversion would be there
for these migration decisions as well.
That said, Maggie,
if there is a major economic recovery,
which I think again, is totally
not only within the realm of possibility,
but like, not unlikely.
And we're already seeing
a little bit of that.
I would expect
that there were some people, certainly
some people from Colombia would return
regardless of their political prospects
for economic reasons.
I absolutely would expect that
thinking about,
kind of South Florida
and like US politics.
Right. I think it will be
we have seen some polling,
the polls out, the polls
that I've seen so far are very tricky.
It's tricky.
Online polls are tricky, so I don't I
take all these polls with a grain of salt.
That said, my sense from the polls is
this is
this intervention was more popular
than you might expect, right.
People
kind of see this as like successfully
removing this incredibly unpopular
dictator.
And so there's some popularity to that.
And at the same time, when we're thinking
about the Venezuelan diaspora
in the United States,
I would think there is not going to be
a lot of enthusiasm or satisfaction
with leaving Delcy in charge.
Even if the economy recovers. Right.
There's got to be some discontent
about that.
And so I think how this plays out
politically in the United States
may depend on what kind of political
developments we see over the next year.
Yeah.
I mean, I would also think that it helps
getting rid of Maduro helps bolster
the case to get rid of temporary
protected status
for Venezuelans without, status.
So I might see
greater deportations up in as well.
And should you not have
a more secure status than TPS?
Yes. And also,
TPS beyond
TPS affecting the number of deportations,
also,
affects the politics, right?
So revoking TPS is not popular.
That's great regardless and regardless.
And but by the way, I think
there's a question we don't know how many
how TPS affects deportation.
Certainly it affects security,
job opportunity, etc..
Financial security in the United States.
My sense
is that the people who are most likely
to be the target of current domestic,
you know, interior
immigration enforcement,
you tell me, Maggie, are not
the most likely to have had TPS,
if that makes sense.
And so I, I don't know,
but I think regardless
of how ending TPS affects deportation,
I don't
I don't think it's popular politically.
Yeah. Okay.
We have some questions
also about like the larger,
international security,
international relations and,
how do you think Maduro's removal affects,
Chinese relationships with Venezuela?
And just like greater
Chinese relations in Latin America.
Yeah.
Yeah. Sorry.
I was just reading the chat as well. So,
I think it's going to be very interesting.
So on the China piece in particular.
So far we have not seen
the US say no more oil sales to China,
at least as of the start of this webinar.
We have not seen that. Right.
And so that could happen,
but that could have happened.
So far it hasn't happened yet.
So I think that's
that's an important thing to note.
You know,
I think that the regional politics of this
have been very interesting in that,
a number of countries
kind of signed a statement
condemning the intervention.
And, and yet,
you see, you know, other countries, right,
that are more on the right
being more so Petro, of course,
as you know, it was against this.
And then we see other countries in
Latin America being surprisingly open to,
hey, Maduro was terrible,
and maybe this could be a good thing
for the welfare of Venezuelans and for
stemming immigration in the medium term.
I mean, one one thing that I think relates
to your previous question about TPS,
Maggie, is that part of the TPS
discussion is about political conditions
in Venezuela, right?
It's about economic conditions
in Venezuela,
but it's about political conditions
as well.
And those conditions are relevant
not only to TPS,
but of course, to also your question
about immigration.
And right now, I would say I think there's
a lot of uncertainty about,
Where political repression
is headed,
because in the days after January 3rd,
we saw what you might expect,
which is this kind of,
you know, anyone who aided
and abetted this
or who like something on social media
that's related to removing
Maduro should be arrested, right?
So this kind of increase in repression,
at the same time
we've seen the release
of some political prisoners.
And so it's I think at this point,
there's just a lot of uncertainty
about the direction and intensity
of political repression
under this new Delcy government.
And that is going to play a big role in
and everything that we're talking about in
the conversation about TPS and immigration
and in regional politics as well.
Yeah, great.
So good question.
So one question that is here is like,
thoughts about violence on all sides.
So you mentioned a potential crackdown
on opposition.
We could also see,
Bryan Pitts mentions that the opposition
has used violence as well.
How much how likely do you think we're
in a new equilibrium that will be,
you know, kind of similarly as peaceful
as the one before
or more peaceful,
or is there likely to see,
greater insurgency or civil war
happen in Venezuela?
Yeah.
Well, I guess I would say a few things.
One, while it is true
that the Venezuelan homicide
rate has plummeted since 2016,
I don't know if I would describe
the country as peaceful
over the last 20 years,
not only because prior to 2016,
there were just very high levels
of criminal violence and homicides,
but also but also under Maduro,
tremendous levels of state violence.
Like we had a point in the Maduro
administration where the government
was killing 5000 people a year,
mostly poor young men in the barrios.
Right. And so,
5000 a year is a lot.
Just to give you a sense of scale, right?
In the U.S, which has a population
more than ten times as large police.
Yeah, police killings are maybe like 1000
a year, 800
a year and 5000 a year,
also way more per capita than Brazil.
And notoriously violent Brazilian police.
So this has been a very it's
been a very violent regime.
I mean,
on the one hand, it is true there are many
different armed groups, right?
There's presence of ELN and Colombian
armed groups on the Colombian border.
There are the megabandas this like,
Venezuelan gangs like Tren de Aragua,
in the center of the country.
In the Arco Minero
and the kind of the south east
where there's a lot of illegal mining,
there's also a lot of presence
of armed groups.
And so I think the potential is there.
I think whether we see a lot of violence,
again,
depends in large part
on whether, the governing
Chavista coalition kind of remains
unified and sticks together or not.
In terms
of the violence of the opposition,
I don't
I don't because of what we said were
Machado doesn't have a lot of support
in the military.
I don't think most analysts are expecting
a civil war between what
Chavista aligned and opposition
aligned elements of the armed forces.
That's not something that I think
a lot of people are talking about.
But yeah, I think that, you know, that the
there are a lot of guns in Venezuela.
And so I think a lot of people
are concerned for good reason.
And I think if that if people remain
united around Delcy,
then maybe we could avoid
that kind of worst case scenario.
Let me also come to Bryan.
I saw this question about the opposition.
So the book,
that I
recommended
earlier by Francisco Rodriguez,
the subtitle is Scorched Earth,
and it kind of takes,
yeah, focuses on the use of,
these kind of more, more,
destructive tactics
and strategies by the opposition.
So I think, Bryan, if you're interested
in that, I would definitely recommend
that book. And.
Yeah, I guess I would.
So I don't know
if everyone can see Bryan's question,
but it's just about Machado
and the political opposition and
and Bryan is saying
it's not the case that that if
they, that team were to come to power,
that equals liberal democracy
and I, I yeah, I mean, I agree with that
and I, I didn't mean
I don't think I suggested as much.
I think my point was
what is I think true is that
Machado
and the candidate that she supported
Edmundo Gonzalez won the 2024
presidential election in a landslide.
Yeah.
Okay.
Great.
So then thinking about
state collapse and, like, concerns
that the military could splinter,
do you does the base
and did the material on the cash and the,
sorry Chavez regime before it
did they do a good enough job of sort of
like rotating generals around,
or do generals have like, their own base
of support that we might be worried about
could lead to a challenge,
especially if, you know, right now
we're setting up this expectation
that a lot more money is coming in. So
you would imagine each generals thinking
like, okay, I'm going to get paid.
But if that doesn't come true,
are we worried that any one of them
has enough support or could pull enough
support to really challenge the state?
Well,
let me recommend some great work on that.
So I think the short answer, Maggie,
is the Chavez and Maduro governments.
I mean, despite the failure of security,
I guess from their perspective
that was on January 3rd,
did a really impressive job of coup
proofing, of purging of repression
in the military, of,
as you're saying, rotating people out and
military intelligence and surveillance.
Right.
Harold
Trinkunas at Stanford
had a great book on civil military
relations in Venezuela going through
into the beginning of the Chavez period.
And then, John Polga-Hecimovich,
I believe is how you pronounce
his last name, has some great recent work
on coup-proofing purges
and repression
within the military and kind of helping,
I think, helping
people understand how it's possible that
with this presidential election
in 2024,
the military nevertheless continued
supporting this incredibly
unpopular regime.
I think there's
some really good work on that.
Yeah. Yeah.
What do you think?
Will Machado have any role
or what do you think her role will be now?
Yeah, it's a great question.
I mean, I think she's indisputably
is still kind
of the leader of the opposition.
If you look at polls,
I think despite again,
losing some popularity relative
to that high point in 2024, remains
Venezuela's
most popular living politician.
So she is kind of voicing
these policy preferences.
And at the same time, as I said,
Trump in his press conference kind of
sidelined her
and certainly does not seem imminent that
that she's going to be taking on,
a leadership role in the government.
Right.
So I think I guess the most likely thing
is that she continues to play
a leadership role in the opposition.
But not imminently in the government
itself.
Yeah.
All right.
Then,
to sort of like
two different thoughts
about how this plays out in the US is one
you've given a little bit of thought
about,
the trial,
do you have any sense of any more sense,
I know you're not a legal expert about
what do you think's likely
to happen at the trial?
And maybe if you think a little bit about,
like, the various precedents
to this trial,
like Noriega and else and others,
and then thinking a little bit about
how different is the Don-roe doctrine?
Not necessarily
the Monroe Doctrine is pretty different
from but like the Roosevelt,
was it the Roosevelt Corollary?
I think, you know, thinking more
about like the Roosevelt Corollary.
And so maybe just stepping back there
and just thinking a little bit more about,
you know, many
ways how different is
is the real difference that like,
we took out Maduro openly versus sending
just the CIA into take him out,
or is this a real break with our policy
in Latin America?
Yeah, great.
Well,
one thing that I think has been
interesting is that it is so tempting
to draw these historical parallels,
and the more
I try to think about historical parallels,
the more this feels different, right?
So even even Panama and Noriega,
which you which you mentioned
and a lot of people have drawn
this parallel to Panama
was just totally,
totally different, in so many ways.
I mean, not only in the scale
of the military operation,
but not only in what what preceded it.
Right.
A U.S service member had already died
right before the US
invasion of Panama
and the removal of Noriega.
But also in that in that event, we.
Landed 26,000 US troops
arrived in Panama and in even so,
it took weeks before that conflict
was over.
Hundreds of of Panamanians died and,
I don't know, 24, 20 something
U.S service members died.
And all of that was the case, even though
Panama was, as one Venezuelan journalist
put it, the first time
Trump brought up the possibility of US
military intervention in Venezuela
was pre invaded
because we already had the base there.
Right.
And so this was this was just as it was
just really different in so many ways.
And also the implications
for the economy were really different.
So I think that's like
a really difficult parallel.
And then when you think about
other,
the many episodes of U.S.
intervention in Latin America
and attempts at and regime change,
although this is
this is not regime change.
Maduro was removed,
but the regime is still there. Right.
But but
like I've seen a lot of other parallels
drawn as well that also don't seem right.
So people compare this to say,
action in Guatemala in
1954, removing Jacobo Arbenz,
and where the U.S.
had a very kind of direct military role.
And so in that case,
maybe there's there's that parallel,
but that was totally different
in terms of the base of domestic support.
This was Arbenz was had been elected,
which, you know,
Maduro was voted out.
And the kind of
domestic balance of popularity
was totally different.
And so that that doesn't
seem like Guatemala in the 50s doesn't
seem like the best parallel people
look at Chile 73, where we
there
was this where the US kind of embraced.
I think it encouraged a coup
removing Salvador Allende.
But in that case, it was a very
it wasn't the US military executing this.
It was we embraced and encouraged it.
And so that and again,
Allende also was elected
and I, you know, was a very serious
politician.
That feels very different as well.
People have also tried to compare this
to Chile
88, in which
the US, this was kind of the
the beginning of the end
or the end of the Pinochet regime,
where the US supported a domestic
Chilean opposition movement,
and then the opposition,
you know, wins this referendum.
And that leads to, to,
to a political transition.
And that also obviously
is a major stretch.
This is not, you know, the US supporting
an electoral attempt to oust Maduro.
So I think this in this does,
there's a lot of things about this
that I think are very unusual
and it's it's
other people have compared it
and maybe closer in some ways
to kind of targeted
political assassinations.
Even though Maduro was not assassinated.
It's like this leadership target
rather than the regime.
So I think,
I certainly have been in looking
for historical parallels,
seeing more differences and similarities
actually.
Great.
And then just let's end with thinking
a little bit about the broader region.
So what do you think it says
for Latin America?
I mean, I know like
Maduro was removed.
Trump started talking about Pietro is the
leader who's the democratically elected
kind of left, I guess, leftist,
in Colombia.
But fairly center left.
It's not that out there, I would say.
And you saw him immediately, like pick
up the phone and be like, hey, look at it.
What can I do for you?
So do you think, leaders in Latin America,
will be more likely to,
sort of kowtow to Trump?
Do you think this means
anything for Lula in Brazil?
And I mean, of course, like
it says, like, oh,
you know, the communist regime in Cuba,
maybe we're coming for you.
But like we've been saying that
for ever now.
So, like, I don't know,
I don't know how much like the Cubans are,
like, well, how different is this
than, you know, many other times before.
So what do you think about, like,
the broader effects on Latin America?
Yeah.
So I don't know.
But one thing that I think is
really important to note, Maggie, is that,
this was in some ways
not a one off in the sense
that we're seeing lots of other signs
of renewed investment in US
military bases in Latin America,
U.S permanent military presence
and renewed engagement with Latin America
and all sorts of other issues.
So, you know this I don't think
we should see this in isolation.
And even just the very the fact of Marco
Rubio being secretary of state like these,
we see Roosevelt Rhodes,
there's a lot of other stuff going on that
I think indicates that this is part
this is seriously part of a broader
strategy of focusing on Latin America,
of making this, a place where U.S.
interests and economic interests
and to the to some extent,
policies are respected.
Like, this does seem to be a broader
effort and not just isolated to Maduro.
That's one thing that's,
I think, also interesting about
what's going on in Venezuela so far is
what have been our demands, our
our meaning, Washington's demands
for the Delcy Rodriguez government.
Right. We we we have all this leverage.
The US has all this leverage
now having made credible
the threat of military intervention,
what are we using it for?
And again, so far,
I think the main demand has been sell oil,
which they were thrilled to do.
That's not a demand. The rate. And so,
you know, I'll be
very curious
to see whether we add to that list.
Yeah.
Great.
Well, that ends rate at 129 130.
So thank you again, Dorothy,
so much for coming.
I really, really appreciate it.
And, thank you again.
Thank you so much for having me.
And, everybody,
you can go check out Dorothy's website.
She's at Berkeley.
You can just Google her and Google
her work.
It's really wonderful.
And then we have, a bunch of different
other,
talks from the Burkle Center coming up.
So thank you all so much for coming today.